Tashkent, Uzbekistan (UzDaily.com) -- An international round table dedicated to strategies of key factors of Central Asian geopolitics was held at the Institute for Central Asian Studies.
As the East exerts an increasing influence on world processes in the field of economics and politics, the main international factors seek to take a leading role in Asia. A special place in Asian architecture belongs to a relatively small but energy-rich region - Central Asia - which determines the flow of energy supplies to all ends of the world, and also has a neighborhood with unstable Afghanistan. The interests of the largest global players are focused on Central Asia. The region can, to some extent, be considered a "key" to the geopolitical future and stability of the entire Asian continent. For this reason, an analysis of the prospects for the development of events and the results of the struggle for influence in the region is of particular interest today.
The EU is an important, but not a leading factor in Central Asia
The first on the agenda at the round table was the strategy of the European Union in Central Asia. The head of the department of international programs and projects of the Volga State Technological University Alexey Fominykh introduced her to the event participants.
He noted that Central Asia falls under the common global goals of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, who will lead it from 2019 to 2024. There are only five of them. First of all, this is the so-called green course - technologies worked out in the EU based on renewable energy sources, aimed at protecting the environment. All this is connected, of course, with the climate agenda. The second big block is positioning the EU as a leader in digitalization, science, technology and innovation. The third point is to support sustainable economic growth and development. Of more practical importance for Central Asia is the course towards the development of partnership in the field of migration. This is a rethinking of the lessons of the migration crisis. And the last one is the maintenance of law and order, cooperation of law enforcement agencies, especially border guard agencies, prevention of terrorism, and the fight against drug trafficking.
Key points of the EU strategy
Speaking more specifically about the EU’s strategy in Central Asia, it should be noted that among its key points, first of all, is the orientation towards building a long-term partnership, but not forced. The region is still latently regarded as a transit zone, a corridor between Europe and Asia. In addition, Central Asia is seen as a promising alternative supplier of hydrocarbon resources to Europe. The region also appears to be a growing market for European goods, services and technologies. And, of course, it is important as a distant frontier of European security, since the unstable Afghanistan is nearby, the risks of migration waves and the neighborhood with China, namely the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, continue to cause concern for the EU.
“The activity of China in the region, the implementation of large-scale infrastructure projects in the region with the participation of the PRC does not allow one to relax either. And finally, Central Asia is seen as a kind of pilot region for testing innovative elements of the EU’s policy in the field of sustainable development, climate and ecology, knowledge economy, civil society, ”says Alexey Fominykh.
Lost US Interest in Central Asia?
Speaking about the role of the United States in Central Asia, first of all, it is important to understand that it is customary in the United States to strictly follow the documents adopted in the field of foreign policy and in the priority of the National Security Strategy. It has become a tradition that each new president, assuming office, offers his own vision of how it stands to relate to various areas of foreign policy.
“After curtailing the active phase of NATO’s military operation in Afghanistan in 2014, American interest in the region began to decline. By the time Donald Trump came to power in 2016, US interest in the Central Asian region seemed to have irrevocably faded. So, Trump’s campaign slogan was "America first." This prompted the Central Asian countries to take a more realistic look at things that were previously considered purely in the format of the so-called “big game”. They began to optimize their foreign policy courses. And in recent years, the Central Asian republics have managed to substantially get rid of the American factor in their foreign policy,” explained Roman Penkovtsev, Associate Professor of the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy at Kazan Federal University.
However, Donald Trump has not ended US involvement in Central Asian issues. In December 2017, a strategy emerged with a separate paragraph on Central Asia. This point correlates with a whole host of others. So, in the strategy of 2017, the so-called "challengers", or opponents, were highlighted, among which there were two states at once, directly or indirectly influencing the region of Central Asia - China and Russia. And this was already a reason to think about the subsequent intensification of US policy in Central Asia. In addition, no one removed from the agenda the problem of terrorist movements in the region itself and in neighboring Afghanistan, first of all.
“And if you start looking at the country’s policy from this angle, then you can understand that the United States has never made any refusal to influence the Central Asian affairs. Moreover, there has been some evolution. For Trump, the concept of the “big game” has changed, several different mechanisms have appeared, and different methods of influencing the region. First of all, the power factor decreases. And in general, under Trump, economic mechanisms of pressure - what we call "soft power" - are beginning to operate more actively, the expert emphasized. It is important that in the document of 2017, perhaps for the first time in the entire American strategic foreign policy initiative over the past 20 years, a very respectful attitude was expressed in relation to the countries of the Central Asian region. All of them are named by name, the region is singled out as an independent value region and there is no clear link between countries to the interests of China or Russia, the region is isolated from the general outline of reasoning. "
Under Trump, a private investment program in the region was strongly encouraged. And the central point is connected with the main threat to the strategic interests of the United States - this is the "One Belt - One Road" project. Trump revived a number of projects as an alternative: CASA-1000, which implies the construction of power lines from the region to Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and the Lapis Corridor, which involves the laying of railways and highways from Afghanistan to Turkmenistan and further across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.
And what is the PRC for Central Asia from the inside?
An important feature when discussing the strategies of the key players in the region is that, in principle, today one cannot speak of Central Asia as an integral single region. Each of the countries has its own position regarding all the actors of geopolitics, said Rustam Burnashev, professor at the Kazakh-German University.
“When we refuse to view Central Asia as an integral region, we have regional interconnections fading into the background, and either internal issues or how the region is influenced by global players come to the fore. And here it is important to understand the place of the region in the alignment of their forces. From my point of view, Central Asia occupies a clearly and distinctly peripheral position. And the periphery is perceived by global players, first of all, as a transit zone,” Burnashev emphasized.
And this is easy to follow from the proposals received by the countries of the region. The EU once came up with a proposal to revive the Silk Road. China came out with the same concept in 2013. Moreover, this concept is still not of a programmatic nature, it is just an initiative in which the understanding of Central Asia is clearly recorded.
“The second moment of peripherality is the problem of domination in the region. We have traditionally always said that China is dominance in the region, expressed implicitly. It has always been economic in nature. Now these are attempts to create an infrastructure link that will be clearly tied to China. Even the internal impact of infrastructure projects is extremely insignificant for the countries of Central Asia. For example, the highways that will pass through Kazakhstan under the project will have minimal value for Kazakhstan itself,” the expert said.
And the third moment - the formation of a certain demarcation zone in the periphery - and again the "big game". And here it is clear that China does not regard Central Asia as a region, as a kind of integrity. The basic principle of the PRC is that agreements and projects are made almost exclusively on a bilateral basis.
“This looks quite positive. And, as a rule, at the state level it is perceived exclusively in this way. But there are certainly hidden problems here. The first is that the intensification of China’s presence in the region and the clash of its positions with other players may lead to the fact that the Central Asian countries will be pushed out of the comfort zone in which we find ourselves due to our peripherality. Strategic uncertainty is forming here,” Rustam Burnashev noted. - And the second problem, which is directly related to China, is whether the Chinese initiatives proposed to the region will be connected not only with the transfer of economic resources, but also with the transfer of ideology. The risk that China will start offering this is quite high. "
Is Turkey’s role great?
Turkey was the first after the collapse of the USSR to recognize the independence of the Central Asian republics and officially established diplomatic relations with them. Then idealistic ideas about the imminent creation of a union of Turkic-speaking states, of course, headed by Turkey, were widespread in Turkey. However, the countries that gained independence did not seek to fall under anyone’s influence. After 2000, when Turkey revised its political approaches based on the existing realities, relations with the Central Asian states began to bear a partnership character and to develop progressively.
“Of course, trade and economic cooperation is reaching a significant scale. The trade turnover, according to the Turkic Council, is almost US$9 billion. And in terms of demographic and economic potential, the Turkic Council is quite capable of competing with the Eurasian Economic Union. Turkey is dynamically increasing its investments in Central Asia, actively participating in the fuel and energy sector. It is worth noting the humanitarian component, Turkey is developing pan-Turkic sentiments in the region. Thus, an international organization of Turkic culture was created. Elementary, secondary schools, higher educational institutions were created, which were financed by the Republic of Turkey. A Turkish kurultai, the Yunus Emre Institute, was created,” said Venera Basharan, senior lecturer at the Department of International Relations, World Politics and Diplomacy at Kazan Federal University.
Turkey and Russia in Central Asia: Is Cooperation Possible?
If we talk about the prospects for Russian-Turkish cooperation in Central Asia, then there are several factors that favor this.
“First of all, it is the factor of potential development of joint projects of regional cooperation. By creating an atmosphere of trust and interest among all participants, both countries can help reduce tensions in the region. In addition, both Turkey and Russia are large European states with significant Muslim populations. One of the foundations for cooperation is the Islamic factor and the active rejection of radical Islamism by countries. There is no need to talk about a full-fledged partnership, taking into account the difference in interests of Turkey and Russia, but in the field of trade, energy projects and security initiatives within the framework of the regional organizations of the EAEU, SCO, CSTO, cooperation and cooperation are quite possible,” Basharan is convinced.
How is Russia building relations with Central Asia?
Andrey Bolshakov, director of scientific programs of the Institute for Central Asian Studies, discussed in detail the role of Russia itself in the region at the round table. He noted that, proceeding from the resources that the Russian Federation currently possesses, it is doing the maximum possible in Central Asia.
"From the point of view of Russian national interests, the safety margin of Russian foreign policy in the post-Soviet space is important," Bolshakov explained.
Integration processes on the platforms of the Union State of Russia and Belarus, the EAEU or the CSTO, aimed at consolidating a part of the post-Soviet space on the basis of common interests and economic ties, hinder the intentions of external players to destroy the interaction of neighbors and chaotic the region.
The Russian Federation currently needs to build up the potential and scale of its economic and humanitarian programs in the post-Soviet space in general, and in Central Asia in particular. In the military-political and diplomatic spheres, Russia has already demonstrated its significant potential, which allows it to conduct regional peacekeeping operations, to provide systematic support to its allies in the political and economic spheres.
Russia pursues a policy of cooperation and association within the EAEU, CSTO, SCO and other international organizations. The following areas of integration are priorities for it. First, security, including an effective joint defense and counter-terrorism policy, cooperation in the areas of social assistance and health care. Secondly, the unification around logistics projects in Eurasia, which serve as drivers of the socio-economic development of a number of territories. Thirdly, a common spiritual and cultural heritage, which is constructed either as a memory of the general Soviet unity, or as a priority of conservative, traditional social values.
Over the past five years, a single labor market and a Customs Union with free movement of goods have been formed. At the same time, a number of agreements were concluded with foreign partners. For example, the EAEU with Vietnam, a non-preferential agreement of the Eurasian Economic Union with China, and an intermediate format EAEU agreement with Iran. In addition, the regime of a single market for services in the first five years of the EAEU’s existence actually spread in the EAEU member countries by almost 60%. The Russian Federation has managed to build a correlation between institutions of multilateral economic integration, military-political cooperation, as well as bilateral relations.
Russia is also successfully developing bilateral cooperation with many CIS countries, regardless of their membership in the EAEU. For example, with Uzbekistan, which received observer status in the EAEU, trade turnover increased in 2019 by 17% compared to 2018 and amounted to $ 6.6 billion.
Apparently, over time, the EAEU (along with the status of an observer) will have different positions of "associated membership" in the union, which will help build a variant of soft integration between countries and prepare various states to join the Eurasian Economic Union.